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This essay turns on a quiet, though intriguing, expression—the sigh—and considers the aesthetic 
work that it performs in the novels of Thomas Hardy. Studies of Hardy’s representation of music 
have acknowledged the conceptual and aesthetic significance of voice tone, cadence, and pitch in 
his writing.1 This attention has not yet extended to specific forms of paralanguage, despite the 
many variants of nonlexical expression in his novels. While the primary focus of the essay is the 
aesthetic, communicative, and biological functions of the sigh itself, the broader imperative is to 
demonstrate how paralanguage was implicated in broader nineteenth-century debates about 
evolution. It does this by setting Hardy’s sighs in conversation with Herbert Spencer’s essay 
“The Origin and Function of Music” (1857), in which Spencer proposed that highly developed 
humans are able to aurally perceive and respond sympathetically to the emotionally heightened 
paralinguistic expressions of others. Hardy’s writing dramatizes a comparable associative 
relationship between paralanguage, listening, and sympathy to that which Spencer proposed in 
“The Origin,” but does not replicate the ideological conditions of Spencer’s model, which had 
reserved the highest forms of sympathy for the “cultivated” few. Hardy’s sustained interest in the 
sigh, I argue, is more overtly related to how the biosemiotics of paralanguage communicate 
insights into emotional conditions that are outside the grasp of language. 
The influence of sympathy on Hardy’s novels has recently been subject to critical 
recovery.2 I seek to develop this work by attending to Hardy’s exploration of sympathy’s 
workings (and failures) through the aesthetic operations of paralanguage. By attending to 
2 
 
nonlexical expression, the essay establishes an original way of thinking about how the aesthetics 
of Hardy’s novels are part of his participation in debates about evolutionary development and, by 
implication, what is to be valued in human nature and behavior.  
The essay is organized around readings of key scenes of sighing—passages where Hardy 
seems to linger over the aesthetics of this expression—in three of his major novels: Tess of the 
D’Urbervilles (1891), The Return of the Native (1878), and The Woodlanders (1887). Woven 
through these readings is a consideration of how Hardy’s representation of the sigh both engages 
with and departs in meaningful ways (tacitly or otherwise) from Spencer’s ideological model, 
and how this participation is realized primarily on an aesthetic level. By invoking elements of 
these evolutionary ideas in his fiction, Hardy’s novels engage with issues of class and inheritance 
without being beholden to the terms of these evolutionary debates. The paralinguistic aesthetics 
evident in his novels do not reveal a direct line of influence from Spencer to Hardy; whereas 
Hardy’s novels probe the problem of sympathy, his writing does not instrumentalize fellow-
feeling as a marker or justification of social division. Instead, I argue, Hardy gestures towards an 
ironic countermodel of cultivated sympathy, one that signals his commitment to developing a 
model of sympathy through an egalitarian standard. 
 
 1. Hardy, Spencer, and the Nature of a Sigh 
Before beginning in earnest, it is worth briefly defending the decision to consider sighing under 
the umbrella of “paralanguage,” given that the term and area of study was only devised in the 
1950s by linguist George L. Trager. While neither Hardy nor Spencer had access to the term 
“paralanguage,” or to an organized discipline of paralinguistic study, both figures demonstrate a 
sustained interest in tone, cadence, pitch, and loudness—all of which have since been 
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schematized as part of linguistic models of paralanguage. In contemporary linguistic study, these 
vocalic modulations have been foregrounded as elementary to the paralinguistic qualities of the 
sigh. In Paralanguage, linguist Fernando Poyatos characterizes the sigh physiologically, as a 
“variably prolonged ingression of respiratory air [. . .] followed immediately by a longer 
egression,” that has been explained “as responding to an involuntary stimulation of respiration by 
lung receptors.” Significantly, Poyatos also acknowledges that the sigh can act as an “eloquent 
paralinguistic message-conveying utterance.”3 Whether produced voluntarily or involuntarily, the 
sigh often indicates heightened emotion, and “the eloquence of a sigh is always there in one 
degree or another,” he argues.4 The meaningfulness of a sigh’s message is altered through pitch 
and intensity (perceived loudness), so that when a sigh follows or precedes a verbal message, it 
can override the linguistic element of such a communication.  
Indicating Hardy’s own alertness to the “eloquence” of paralanguage, Poyatos quotes 
directly from Tess of the D’Urbervilles while discussing how a sigh’s intensity can modify its 
intended or perceived meaningfulness. Poyatos describes this “word-like, perhaps ineffable, 
breathing behaviour” and refers to the inconclusive signification of Alec D’Urberville’s sigh after 
Tess confirms that she can never love him, and in response Alec emits “a laboured breath, as if 
the scene were getting rather oppressive to his heart, or to his conscience, or to his gentility.”5 
Poyatos’s reference to the quotation is in passing, and I would add that the conjunction that 
precedes the sigh—“as if”—is a suggestive one. It implies that the full meaning of Alec’s sigh 
remains undeciphered by the narrator, and perhaps even Alec himself is unable to fully account 
for its significance; the passage does not resolve whether Tess’s admission strikes an 
uncomfortable blow to Alec’s “heart,” his “conscience,” his “gentility,” or all three. More than 
once Hardy remarks on how a sigh has a distinct “nature.” In Far from the Madding Crowd 
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(1874), for instance, Sergeant Troy adds “a sigh which had as much archness in it as a sigh could 
possess without losing its nature altogether.”6 Here, the sigh almost extends over the threshold of 
its own type and becomes something else entirely, thus implying that a sigh has something of its 
own intrinsic logic or ontology. As this example suggests, the nature of the sigh is a subtle one, 
and Hardy registers an aesthetic interest in discerning what constitutes this nature, as well as what 
marks the sigh as different to other expressions such as gasping, sobbing, or groaning. The subtle 
elusiveness that often (perhaps paradoxically) distinguishes the sigh seems particularly intriguing 
for Hardy and is an aspect I will explore in more detail further along in the essay.  
For the moment, I want to consider another scene from Tess of the D’Urbervilles, when 
the dairymaids of Talbothays Dairy have retired to their shared bedroom to discuss, and sigh 
over, their youthful longing for Angel Clare. In this passage, the transmissive quality of the sigh 
precipitates a kind of sympathy between the milkmaids. Close attention to the particular 
aesthetics of this sympathy, I want to suggest, discloses echoes of Spencer’s theory of musical 
evolution. “One sighed,” Hardy writes, 
 
and another sighed, and Marian’s plump figure sighed biggest of all. Somebody in bed 
hard by sighed too. Tears came into the eyes of Retty Priddle, the pretty red-haired 
youngest—the last bud of the Paridelles, so important in the county annals. They watched 
silently a little longer, their three faces still close together as before, and the triple hues of 
their hair mingling.7  
 
The placement of the commas in the first sentence of the passage separate each of the four 
dairymaid’s sighs into discrete utterances—what we might think of as individual units of feeling, 
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as if to suggest that each girl’s earnest pining for Angel Clare is interiorized to the point that such 
conditions of longing cannot possibly be shared. The commas appear to isolate the girls’ 
emotional states. Yet at the same time, Hardy’s deep attentiveness to the cadence of language 
creates a movement across and between the commas. The repetition of “sighed”—this deeply 
sibilant word—generates a pulse within the syntax, an undertow of rhythm that also draws the 
reader’s attention toward other prose-rhythmic strategies at play. The first word, “one,” is 
partially echoed in “another,” which merges with the “and” that precedes it by way of the 
repeated “an” sounds, mingling the two vowel sounds. The initiating sibilance of “sighed” is then 
reversed in “tears” and “eyes,” meaning this sibilance has a more enduring sonic effect; almost 
as though the accumulation of shared sighs has a more sustained effect on Retty Priddle’s 
emotional state and brings her to tears. The aesthetics of form interact and intersect with the 
matter of this moment: the prose-rhythm elements of the passage create an undertow that 
disrupts the commas’ grammatical function to circumscribe each girl’s wistful sigh.  
Hardy’s attention to the sigh and its relation to sympathy reflect a more general 
association between human nonverbal communication and sympathy in scientific inquiry at the 
time. A key figure in these debates, and well known to Hardy, was Herbert Spencer. The 
associative link that Hardy draws between the accumulation of sighs and the production of 
sympathy between the milkmaids has affinities with the argument Spencer had presented in his 
1857 essay on musical evolution, “The Origin and Function of Music.” Hardy was familiar with 
the specifics of Spencer’s theory. He owned a copy of Essays: Scientific, Political and 
Speculative (1858), a miscellany of Spencer’s less classifiable works in which “The Origin” 
(originally published in Fraser’s Magazine) had been reprinted.8 In “The Origin,” Spencer had 
asserted that as instinctive responses to unusual events, all displays of strong feeling are the 
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result of muscular reactions that affect the “loudness, quality or timbre, pitch, intervals, and rate 
of variation” (italics original) of the voice, writing that these “variations of the voice are the 
physiological results of variations of feeling.”9 Though Spencer did not specifically identify 
sighing as one of these differentials, the postscript in his later 1890 version of the article, which 
was prepared for an updated edition of the Essays, concludes with an intriguing quotation from 
Emily Gerard’s travelogue The Land beyond the Forest (1888). Spencer quotes Gerard’s 
metaphorical description of the movement of an adagio, which opens “with a slow rhythmical 
movement: it is a sighing and longing of unsatisfied aspirations; a craving for undiscovered 
happiness.”10 For both Gerard and Spencer it seems, the sigh conveys an emotional 
expressiveness that indicates its close proximity to, if not direct participation in, the economy of 
vocal changes linked with strong emotion.  
Both Charles Darwin and Spencer had offered theories on the evolutionary origins of 
music, and these theories became the touchstone for ensuing debates on the subject in the 
nineteenth century. The theory Spencer proposed in “The Origin” conflicted with Darwin’s 
popular hypothesis, which held that animal music (such as birdsong) had developed in order to 
assist with mate selection and reproduction.11 Such was the preeminent influence of their 
conflicting theories that the British Quarterly Review felt compelled to apostrophize that “There 
are, as is well known, two leading theories with regard to the origin of music—Mr. Darwin’s and 
Mr. Spencer’s.”12 Following Darwin, psychologist Edmund Gurney took issue with Spencer’s 
theory in his 1876 “On Some Disputed Points in Music.” Gurney made a searing evaluation of 
Spencer, writing: “On not one of these heads does he seem to me to succeed in making his case.” 
Transcribing this passage from Gurney’s article into his notebook, Hardy annotated the passage 
with a terse rejoinder nestled in square brackets: “[no: Mr S. is right].”13 In doing so, Hardy 
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signaled his firm support for Spencer’s conviction that music had developed from the rhythm and 
emotionally expressive contours of paralanguage. 
The sympathy between the milkmaids in Tess is precipitated by their listening to each 
other’s sighs, which indicates Hardy’s alertness to another key aspect of Spencer’s theory; 
namely, that listening to vocal modulations can stimulate sympathy. When “strong” emotion 
causes an alteration in another person’s voice, Spencer had argued, the listener associates this 
vocal shift with their own experience of strong emotion, which can prompt sympathetic 
identification. Thus, for Spencer, “these various modifications of voice become not only a 
language through which we understand the emotions of others, but also the means of exciting our 
sympathy with such emotions” (400). The specific act of listening to vocal modifications is 
central to generating the shared state of sympathy: “these modifications of voice produced by 
feelings [. . .] enable the hearer not only to understand the state of mind they accompany, but to 
partake of that state” (407). Similarly, in Hardy’s expression a single sigh stimulates a reflexive 
effect on the listener, prompting a reciprocal sighed response. That is to say, the first milkmaid’s 
sigh seems to directly activate the second, which then prompts the third, and so on, thus 
emphasizing how the girls’ emotional states are both separate and shared—an idea further 
suggested by their physical closeness and the “mingling” of their hair. The act of listening to one 
sigh induces another, the sympathetic transference produced specifically through the milkmaids’ 
aural responsiveness to one another, which signals a mode of sympathy that is both cumulative 
and mimetic. 
 
 2. Cultivating Sympathy 
8 
 
While there are intriguing affinities between the associative links that Hardy draws between 
paralanguage, sympathy, listening, and the Spencerian model that he admired, these qualities do 
not equate to a simple mapping of Spencer’s theory onto Hardy’s writing. Roger Ebbatson has 
suggested that “the imprint of Spencer may be traced in several aspects of Hardy’s fiction.”14 Yet 
Hardy’s fiction does not amount to a distillation of Spencerian thinking, and neither is this 
“imprint” fully realized in the working of Hardy’s paralinguistic aesthetics. Underpinning 
Spencer’s model was an ideological conviction that only the highest classes of society were 
capable of the most developed forms of sympathy, and this principle is simply not borne out in 
Hardy’s fiction. As John Glendening notes, “In Hardy’s world it is generally not the lower class 
that blocks positive, humane forces nor rigorously maintains social restraint.”15 When sympathy 
fails in Hardy’s narratives (which it often does), the responsibility for this failure is not 
presumed—as it is in Spencer’s writing—on a naturalized sense that the lower classes have a less 
acute sense of sympathy than those of a higher social standing.  
Spencer had articulated this hierarchical vision of sympathy by arguing that “feelings of 
higher and more complex kinds”—in other words, the higher and more complex kinds of 
sympathy—were “as yet experienced only by the cultivated few.” Within the parameters of his 
theoretical model, this meant that modifications of the voice did not produce sympathetic 
responsiveness in all listeners. While paralanguage (and indeed lower forms of sympathy) might 
be a trait shared between animals, infants, and men, the “higher” stage of sympathetic 
identification and its altruistic effect was reserved for humans of a “civilized,” “developed,” or 
“cultivated” sensibility. Though Spencer predicted that evolutionary progress would eventually 
lead to an increase in sympathy across a broader social demographic, this vision of universal 




[D]o we not find among different classes of the same nation, differences that have like 
implications? The gentleman and the clown stand in decided contrast with respect to 
variety of intonation. Listen to the conversation of a servant-girl, and then to that of a 
refined lady, and the more delicate and complex changes of voice used by the latter will 
be conspicuous. Now, without going so far as to say that out of all the differences of 
culture to which the upper and lower classes are subjected, difference of musical culture 
is that to which alone this difference of speech is ascribable; yet we may fairly say that 
there seems a much more obvious connexion of cause and effect between these than 
between any others. (407) 
 
Here, Spencer consolidates the contrast between the “lower emotions” of the working classes and 
“higher emotions” of genteel society in terms of access to musical culture. In “Developed 
Music,” published in Facts and Comments (1902), he further observed that “we may recognize a 
contrast between the music of coarse exhilaration and the music of refined exhilaration.” In 
social spaces frequented by the working classes such as music halls, “arrangements of ugly 
musical phrases yield an effect attractive to the uncultured: musical doggerel, we may call it.” 
The “developed” music that Spencer lauds as evidence of humanity’s capacity for higher 
progress, “Cherubini’s overtures and many of Mozart’s sonatas,” was only to be heard in the 
concert halls by civilized members of society.16  
The taxonomy of aesthetic response that Spencer outlines in these observations of 
musical style and performance served an ideological function, separating the moral wheat from 
the immoral chaff within a scientific framework. It is also symptomatic of the deep entanglement 
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of aesthetic taste with civil and moral development that had been inaugurated in the eighteenth 
century, here presented with the certainty of science.17 In nineteenth-century thinking, “taste,” or 
a refined aesthetic sensibility, “was the mark of moral cultivation and social bonding.”18 In this 
ideological model, the highest forms of sympathy were contingent on the cultivated aesthetic 
responsiveness of the most highly developed of humans. The higher forms of sympathy were, for 
Spencer, partially predicated on refined aural awareness—an element of his thinking that 
underlines his observations on the difference in musical taste between the higher and lower 
classes. There is often a conflation in Spencer’s thinking between genetic characteristics that are 
biologically inherited and cultural experience that is socially derived, one that there is not space 
here to fully disentangle. However, suffice it to say that if, as Spencer had suggested in The Data 
of Ethics (1879), those who “care nothing about the feelings of other people are, by implication, 
shut out from a wide range of aesthetic pleasures,” then the converse was also true to an extent: 
those without a refined aesthetic sensibility were prone to a less acute sympathy and vice versa.19 
For Spencer, the most developed forms of sympathy were considered generative, as well as a 
sign, of both cultivation and morality, and therefore linked the two together. In this virtuous 
circle, Spencerian sympathy thus becomes conceptually centralized to the idea of cultivation in 
both a moral and an aesthetic sense.  
The broader evolutionary principle behind Spencer’s scaled vision of society and culture 
was the Great Chain of Being—a hierarchical organization of the natural world from the lowest 
rudimentary forms of life to its apogee in man, which offered a confirmation of human 
supremacy and acted as a salve against the inherent randomness, chance, and uncertainty of 
Darwin’s evolutionary system.20 Pam Morris describes how Spencer “accounted for the divisions 
of wealth, employment, and status in society purely in terms of gradation of the different social 
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classes upon a biological evolutionary scale.” The Great Chain itself was often translated into a 
sociological register in order to suit such ideological posturing, in an effort to deny “the poor, 
along with other races and women, the capacity for a fully human nature, now understood as the 
interiority of sensibility.” 21 The logic of this scaled vision of human society was made explicit in 
Spencer’s account of cultivated sympathy, wherein the unsympathetic “cruelty of the barbarous” 
and the sympathetic “humanity of the civilised” were divided in terms of race and class. Again, 
Spencer seems to synthesize hereditary characteristics with aesthetic experience, by suggesting 
that while the capacity for sympathy is partly biologically inherited, the effects of aesthetic 
culture can contribute to the cultivation of sympathy.  
Whereas Hardy clearly found Spencer’s evolutionary theory of musical origins 
persuasive, his aesthetics do not reproduce the neat correlation Spencer drew between class, 
cultivation, and fellow-feeling. Before developing this claim through readings of The Return of 
the Native and The Woodlanders, I want to briefly return to the scene in Tess wherein Hardy 
appears to ascribe this “higher” sympathetic facility to the dairymaids. Signifiers of the 
agricultural laboring-classes, the sensuality and “rough” manners of the dairymaids would fall 
far short of the refined sensibility on which Spencer’s highest form of sympathy was predicated. 
Alert to the terms of the debate with which he is engaging, Hardy draws the reader’s attention to 
Retty Priddle’s genealogical descendance as “the last bud of the Paridelles, so important in the 
county annals.” The Paridelles, a once noble family since fallen into economic decline and now 
working the land they once owned, serves as a doubling motif with Tess’s own ancestral history 
from D’Urberville to Durbeyfield. The degeneration of once “cultivated” houses serves as an 




This ironic inversion of evolutionary teleology extends to the mode of sympathy that 
develops out of the accumulation of the milkmaids’ sighs, where each milkmaid listens to, 
identifies emotionally with, and responds in kind to the sigh. Hardy dramatizes a sympathy 
among the working and laboring classes that echoes the kind that Spencer had proposed but takes 
place precisely along the margin of society that Spencer considered too coarse for such advanced 
sensibility. There seems a further indirect allusion to the kinds of evolutionary ideas circulated 
by Spencer when the mode of writing hastily resolves into indirect discourse as Tess considers 
her own exceptionality in decidedly Spencerian terms; “Being more finely formed, better 
educated” (152), she considers this refinement as evidence that she must be Angel’s preferred 
lover. Irony aside, the aesthetic energy of the passage derives from the musicality of Hardy’s 
representation of the sigh, and the lingering impression of the scene is that sympathy operates as 
a transient, collective experience between all four of the dairymaids, not just between Retty and 
Tess—the noble lineage-bearers brought low—but also with Marian and Izz Huett, who are not 
sprung from such patrician origins. 
 
3. The Matter of a Sigh 
If Hardy’s aesthetics gesture toward an ambivalence toward the hierarchical organization of 
human sympathy that had been narrativized in works such as Spencer’s, this correlates with his 
conviction that authorship bears a degree of moral responsibility to democratize the sympathetic 
impulse. Spencer’s categorization of sympathy, which was based explicitly on racial and class 
differences, likely jarred with Hardy’s commitment to producing works that, as he wrote in “The 
Science of Fiction,” demonstrate “a sympathetic appreciativeness of life in all its manifestations” 
(my emphasis).22 Furthermore, as Caroline Sumpter has shown, Hardy shared with his friend and 
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mentor Leslie Stephen a conviction that the moral purpose of the author was to champion ethical 
growth through aesthetic means.23 Hardy “said that any community would contain a minority of 
‘sensitive souls,’” as Roger Ebbatson has noted.24 And because Hardy does not replicate 
Spencer’s assumption that emotional sensitivity or sympathy is less acute among the lower 
classes, in his novels this sensitivity is not predicated on the same powerful conflation of 
biological inheritance, cultivation, and sympathy that Spencer espoused.  
Speaking more broadly, sympathy as an experiential mode that both operates upon and 
generates an egalitarian standard is in step with how Hardy considered that altruistic behavior 
might be brought into being. Writing in 1890, he proposed that 
 
Altruism, or The Golden Rule, or whatever “Love your Neighbour as Yourself” may be 
called, will ultimately be brought about I think by the pain we see in others reacting on 
ourselves, as if we and they were a part of one body. Mankind, in fact, may be and 
possibly will be viewed as members of one corporeal frame.25  
 
In this statement, humanity is envisioned as a giant organism of connective tissues. Hardy 
establishes a sense of leveling sympathy, which might render the whole of humanity equalized 
upon a shared plane of felt existence. This idealized form of sympathy is predicated on a 
reflexive, materially derived responsiveness to the suffering of others. Abberley notes that 
“instinctive communication encodes sympathy in [Hardy’s] fiction which conventional 
language suppresses.”26 This type of “instinctive communication,” and the sympathy that it can 
produce, is captured by the sigh. In Hardy’s writing, the sigh often emerges when heightened 
emotion overtakes social convention and is difficult to contain or stifle, partly because it is not 
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always a voluntary or consciously expressed display of emotion, as in The Woodlanders, when 
Grace declares “she did not mind it; but she sighed,” her sigh unintentionally revealing her 
genuine feelings on the matter.27 Furthermore, on the threshold between breath, sound, and 
language, the sigh is elusive as an expression; it resists schematization. Hence its aesthetic 
potential for Hardy, who dramatizes its migratory prowess as a vehicle of emotion. Poyatos 
acknowledges that classifying the sigh is difficult because of this equivocality, writing that “the 
stimulus is in many instances much more unidentifiable and elusive—let alone the many 
emotional blends that may trigger sighing—and all the possible contextual elements lead often 
to misinterpretation.”28 Both Hardy and Spencer recognize that paralinguistic sympathy 
involves a high degree of contingency. Spencer considered that this contingency could be 
surmounted by a cultivated mode of listening that would recognize and respond sympathetically 
to the various emotional “blends” that prompt changes in vocal tone, cadence, and pitch. While 
Hardy’s deep curiosity in the potential of the sigh prioritizes its efficacy as means by which to 
pool affect, his writing also signals an interest in how its elusiveness can result in precisely the 
kind of misidentification to which Poyatos refers.  
 Hardy does not shy away from the sigh’s elusive quality but actively experiments with 
both its possibilities and limits. Early in The Return of the Native, he toys with the idea of how 
such expressiveness might encourage the extension of sympathy between the human and natural 
realms. Eustacia (as yet unnamed) stands watching a lighted window on the heath below 
through a telescope after the bonfire on Rainbarrow is abandoned. Hardy writes:  
 
Suddenly, on the barrow, there mingled with all this wild rhetoric of night a sound which 
modulated so naturally into the rest that its beginning and ending were hardly to be 
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distinguished. The bluffs had broken silence, the bushes had broken silence, the heather-
bells had broken silence; at last, so did the woman; and her articulation was but as 
another phrase of the same discourse as theirs. Thrown out on the winds it became 
twined in with them, and with them it flew away. 
What she uttered was a lengthened sighing, apparently at something in her mind 
which had led to her presence here. There was a spasmodic abandonment about it as if, 
in allowing herself to utter the sound, the woman’s brain had authorized what it could 
not regulate. (55–56) 
 
This passage focuses on “a sound,” but Hardy does not give the reader a description of what this 
specific sound is until later in the passage. The disclosure of what the sound that “mingles with 
the wild rhetoric of night” actually “is” becomes deferred—instead, the description focuses on 
how this “sound” combines seamlessly with the other sounds: the bluffs, and the bushes, and the 
heather bells. The repetition of “and” throughout the passage induces a sense of individual 
sounds aggregating into a cohesive harmony. And when Eustacia’s voice finally unites with the 
chorus of the heath, her expression is not articulated in words but a sounded “sigh.” Following 
the extended pause of the semicolon, Eustacia’s sigh is the final “and” that completes the 
compound soundscape. The heath becomes an almost sensate, breathing organism that 
apparently impels Eustacia not simply to play witness to its soundscape but to enter into its mood 
and become part of it; “her articulation was but as another phrase of the same discourse as theirs” 
(52). The scene invites a reading of a harmonious coextension between human and organic life, a 
vision of sympathetic reciprocity between nature and humanity where the sighs of the organic 
and human worlds are “phrase[s] of the same discourse.” The bluff in this scene is Hardy’s 
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leading the reader to assume that Eustacia’s sigh must be the result of “something in her mind” 
that fortuitously corresponds with the “emotion” of the heath’s soundscape, when, in fact, the 
sigh is actually prompted by the human activity Eustacia surveys. While Hardy ultimately 
retreats from fully realizing the tantalizing possibility of human-organic sympathy, the sheer 
aesthetic work that the passage performs leaves the sense that the mimetic resonance between 
Eustacia’s sigh and the sounds of the heath has not been fully abandoned, as its vestiges still 
echo in the reader’s inner ear. There is a pronounced, lingering sense that Eustacia’s sigh could 
in fact have been produced by any combination—conscious or otherwise—of these emotional 
triggers.  
Both here and elsewhere in the novel, Eustacia’s sighs seem to hold a form of matter—
both physical and psychological—that cannot be fully unfolded in words. Hardy’s interest in 
tracing the particular equivocality of the sigh continues over the course of the novel, where he 
again considers how the potency of the sigh is diminished when attempts are made to pin down, 
explain, or ascribe a single source of emotion to its occurrence. Often, these attempts at linguistic 
decryption strike a false note, resulting in a failure of sympathetic identification. As much as the 
sigh’s diffusiveness can facilitate moments of associative responsiveness, then, it can also 
become implicated in interpretative misgivings.  
Eustacia’s repressed emotions often escape in paroxysms that shake her whole frame like 
“a pestilent blast.”29 At times her unregulated, involuntary sighs seem wayward, unfettered from 
the operations of the voice and not wholly a manifestation of the conscious mind, but impressing 
upon her body so forcefully as to incite a vibrating tremor that shakes her. As Steven Connor 
suggests, the distinctness of the sigh is not brought about by being “pressed out into audibility, 
impressed into audible shapes and postures, but seems rather to be escaping.”30 “That tragic 
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sigh” of Eustacia’s, which is “so much like a shudder,” is typically released in seclusion, when 
there is no one (except perhaps the heath) to listen or respond (143). Eustacia’s sighs are both a 
symptom and the result of her isolated state, the “sudden listenings between her sighs” met by 
silence. Yet these isolated moments are also when she is most free—free to give breath to 
dissatisfaction, frustration, despair, longing.  
On a rare occasion when someone else is present to hear her, Clym unsuccessfully 
attempts to decipher the meaning of Eustacia’s sigh. For Eustacia, Clym’s metropolitanism 
following five years spent in Paris is deeply attractive: “A young and clever man was coming 
into that lonely heath from, of all contrasting places in the world, Paris. It was like a man coming 
from heaven” (108). In her abstracted conception of Clym, Eustacia envisions a man who has 
been imbued with the sophistication of the French capital, “the centre and vortex of the 
fashionable world” (109), steeped in all the cultural activity Spencer considered important to the 
refinement of sensibility. Yet as their later exchange demonstrates, this refinement has not 
resulted in the sympathetic identification that Spencer trusted it would generate. Eustacia emits 
one of her tragic sighs, and Clym responds: “You sigh, dear, as if you were sorry for it; and 
that’s a hopeful sign.” Eustacia responds, “No. I don’t sigh for that. There are other things for me 
to sigh for, or any other woman in my place” (247). The apparently singular meaning of her sigh 
is subject to Clym’s logical mode of decryption, which emphasizes the failure of language to 
fulfill its communicative function. Clym seeks to pin down a fixed signification to Eustacia’s 
sighs, but his logic-driven interpretation remains an incomplete means for sharing the emotions 
that prompt them.  
Hardy’s sighs draw attention toward the inadequacy of language as a way of determining 
and vicariously experiencing the blends of emotion that trigger such paralinguistic expression. 
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Spencer also recognized that interpretation alone was an incomplete means for producing fellow-
feeling, and that the intellect can encroach unhelpfully on sympathetic identification. In “The 
Purpose of Art,” Spencer suggested that sympathy involves a two-stage process. The first stage, 
“Before there can be sympathy,” requires a cultivated knowledge of the “natural language of the 
emotions,” which are communicated through vocal alterations and body language: “what tones 
and changes of voice, what facial expressions, what movements of the body, signify certain 
states of mind.” However, the “knowledge of this natural language does not constitute 
sympathy,” as there may be “clear perception of the meanings of all these traits without any 
production of fellow feeling.”31 The production of sympathy requires a secondary stage, which is 
essential to grasping the essence of these changes and feeling them too, and is infinitely subtler 
and more refined than the first. However, Spencer does not articulate what this second stage 
actually is, or the kind of approach it requires. The quality of sympathy is beyond articulation for 
him; while stressing the importance of extricating the intellectual from the emotional elements of 
sympathetic experience, he comes unstuck when it comes to identifying how sympathy actually 
operates.  
Spencer’s inability to articulate the experience of sympathy seems inevitable given that 
he is attempting to describe such experience through “the intellectual element”: a logical, 
scientific type of language, which, as he acknowledges, infringes on the emotional type of 
language.32 This deductive, reasoning approach is not able to capture the affective quality of 
sympathy. The difficulty that Spencer runs into goes some way in clarifying why Hardy’s 
writing is able to accomplish what Spencer’s cannot. Hardy stresses how paralinguistic 
expressions such as the sigh do not mean in ways that can be reproduced through the linguistic 
method, but rather embody a multiplicity of emotion that resides outside the strict parameters of 
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language. The sigh rarely expresses a single mood, but mood in its more collective, elusive, and 
indefinable sense; its immediacy expresses the atmosphere of one’s being in a form that exists as 
a shadow of language. And the sigh, as Hardy shows us in Eustacia and Clym’s vexed exchange, 
does not readily give up its nebulous expressivity to the logical systems of decipherment. Hardy 
makes this point aesthetically as much as narratively; in attending so carefully to the poetic 
elements of his prose, at its finest his writing is enveloped in a mantle of rhythmic and phonetic 
affect that at once heightens and resists its subject matter. Effectively, Hardy’s writing 
mimetically performs a similar kind of work on an aesthetic level that the sigh does on an 
emotional level. The rhythmic elements so central to Hardy’s meditations, particularly in those 
passages on the sigh I have dwelt on so far, mean that these textual moments rely on their 
sounding as much as their wording for their affective intensity. And the sigh itself—in all its 
nebulous elusiveness—provides a vehicle for expressing the more unutterable forms of feeling. 
 
4. Reflection, Sympathy, and the Sigh 
Whereas I have so far dwelt on the instinctive, physiologically determined element of 
paralanguage in both Hardy’s and Spencer’s writing, to consider nonlexical expression 
exclusively in this way would be to overlook the reflective aspect often present in Hardy’s sighs, 
as well as the reflective sensibility required for Spencer’s higher forms of sympathy. Certainly, 
both Spencer and Hardy located the primary mechanisms of emotional expression in the 
instinctive physiological body. However, it is also possible to detect the influence of the 
philosophical tradition of sympathy on both writers, wherein reflection was considered a central 
and defining feature of human sympathy. Eighteenth-century philosophical models of sympathy 
advanced by David Hume, and adapted by Adam Smith, had stressed the significance of 
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reflection in the process of human sympathy. Discussing such models, Michael L. Frazer 
explains that in eighteenth-century formulations of fellow-feeling,  
 
 The natural language of feeling can communicate emotion from one creature to another 
on an instinctual level, but the same reflective awareness that gives human beings 
consciousness of their own emotions also allows them to artificially communicate them 
to others through the medium of language. This allows for the formation of a uniquely 
human form of sympathy.33  
 
The influence of these earlier models seems apparent in both Hardy’s and Spencer’s 
formulations. As I have already outlined, for Spencer the most elementary form of sympathy 
was bound to the “natural language of feeling,” but the highest and most developed forms of 
sympathy required the addition of a refined, reflective aural consciousness. The reflective 
element of sympathy could thus represent for Spencer a dividing line between the “higher” and 
“lower” sympathetic development of humans and animals (as well as different races and 
classes) and was ameliorated through the effects of culture. Aesthetic culture was one means by 
which sensibility was refined, and so the fundamental link that Spencer perceived between 
aesthetic sensibility and high forms of sympathy consolidated his conviction that both were 
indices of advanced human development.  
Significantly, Hardy also encodes a reasoning, reflective element in his representations of 
the sigh, as if to suggest the sigh might sometimes (though not always) convey an outward 
expression of the reflections of the mind. For instance, whenever “a flash of reason” exposes 
Wildeve’s inadequacy, Eustacia sighs a “sigh which shook her like a shiver” (65). Elsewhere in 
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his writing, the sigh is similarly dramatized as an expression that can simultaneously embody 
both instinct and reflection, blending the two together in a single exhalation. In The 
Woodlanders, Grace Melbury’s “sigh of sympathy with Giles” is “complicated by a sense of the 
intractability of circumstances” (82), indicating how her intuitive affinity with Giles is beset by 
her reflective understanding that fidelity to him would result in a betrayal of her father’s wishes. 
In Tess, Angel expresses to Tess that he fears he has “been too quick and unreflecting,” an 
admission that takes place directly after he emits a “curious sigh of desperation, signifying 
unconsciously that his heart had outrun his judgment” (167). As such, Angel’s sigh is 
demonstrative of a belated reflection and precipitates the transitory synchrony between Angel 
and Tess, narratively described as the “gravitation of the two into one” (167). If, as I have been 
suggesting, the sigh was part of a cluster of nonlexical communicative forms that Hardy thought 
might offer more authentic alternatives to language—both for expressing emotion and 
recognizing complex emotions in others—it seems significant that he repeatedly invokes this 
sense of instinct with reflection.  
For Hardy, bestowing a reflective as well as instinctive facility onto the sigh offers a way 
to avoid language altogether, so that paralinguistic expression might do the communicative work 
of language and much more besides. As Abberley notes, for Hardy, “The path to a more humane 
society might lie in rediscovering these bio-semiotics rather than stifling them.”34 This 
nonlexical mode of communication would certainly cohere with his tentatively held vision of an 
altruistic future where humanity might act like “one corporal frame,” an interconnected, 
symbiotic network of responsiveness comparable to the sympathetic nervous system.  
Through the sigh, Hardy gestures toward the possibility of a non-lexically-derived 
sympathy, but his novels dwell on the chasms that must be bridged before such a future might be 
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realized. As we have seen, Spencer thought that the active cultivation of sensibility might hasten 
the development of society toward a universal sympathy. In The Woodlanders, it seems that, for 
Hardy, the terms of the debate must be reassessed before any such progress is possible, 
especially with regard to the idea of cultivation. Megan Ward has argued that Hardy offers “a 
skeptical view” of cultivation as a form of self-improvement in The Woodlanders. The ultimate 
failure of protagonist Grace Melbury’s cultivation, Ward suggests, demonstrates Hardy’s 
demystification of “the naturalizing power of cultivation,” as well as his denial of a “nostalgic, 
unified sense of nature.”35 Ward’s argument is persuasive, and I think that a similar concern 
emerges in his characterization of Marty South, who acts as protagonist Grace Melbury’s 
narrative foil over the course of the novel. Unlike Grace, who has returned to Little Hintock 
“mentally trained and tilled into foreignness of view” after an expensive educational program 
(100), Marty has no formal education and has remained in Little Hintock to support her ailing 
father. She is in love with Giles Winterbourne, who has been informally betrothed to Grace since 
their youth. While Marty and Giles replant trees in a recently cleared coppice, Marty remarks:  
 
“How they sigh directly we put ’em upright, though while they are lying down 
they don’t sigh at all,” said Marty. 
“Do they?” said Giles. “I’ve never noticed it.” 
She erected one of the young pines into its hole, and held up her finger; the soft 
musical breathing instantly set in which was not to cease night or day till the grown tree 
should be felled—probably long after the two planters had been felled themselves. 
“It seems to me,” the girl continued, “as if they sigh because they are very sorry to 
begin life in earnest—just as we be.” 
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“Just as we be?” He looked critically at her. “You ought not to feel like that, 
Marty.” (59) 
 
Given the depth of Marty’s connection with the local landscape, it is unsurprising that she is 
receptive to the minutiae of its sounds. What is more surprising, perhaps, is that despite Giles’s 
and Marty’s shared understanding of the “finer mysteries” of the Hintock woods “as of 
commonplace knowledge,” Giles has never noticed such a phenomenon (297). The difference in 
their responsiveness to the sound is explicable in part because of the asymmetry of feeling 
between the two. That is to say, because Marty is in love with Giles and is aware that her feelings 
are unreciprocated, she not only hears the sound of the murmuring wind through the branches of 
the young pines but confers an emotional expressivity onto it. This emotion corresponds with her 
sadness; thus, Marty integrates the “mood” of organic matter with her own.  
Marty construes the environmental sound as a mournful “sigh,” before actively reflecting 
the expressiveness of the sigh back onto the human condition of Giles and herself: “just as we 
be.” The extension of the em dash relates the life span of the trees to that of the planters. This 
relation emphasizes the connectedness of the natural and the human world, while at the same time 
indicating the disparities between the duration of their lives—the newly planted trees will outlast 
the humans. The next em dash in the passage, which precedes Marty’s “just as we be,” acts as a 
grammatical, visual, and conceptual echo of the former; Marty recognizes a sympathy between 
Giles and herself and tries to express it. At the same time, her awareness of the asymmetry in 
their romantic feelings for each other precludes her expressing this sympathy without recourse to 
the landscape that binds them together. There is the sense that Marty is beseeching Giles to hear 
what she cannot express to him directly, to attend to what is unspoken, and thus to feel the 
24 
 
unutterable pain that she feels—she wants Giles to feel with her in the same way that she feels 
with him.  
The impulse behind Marty’s candid declaration that “they sigh because they are very 
sorry to begin life in earnest—just as we be” is twofold. It refers both to the saplings, transplanted 
into the ground where they will grow up “in earnest,” as well as to the maturation of Giles and 
herself as they enter the strictures of adulthood. However, it also indicates a broader conviction, 
that “not to have been born is best.” Hardy borrowed this philosophically weighty phrase from 
Sophocles, citing it in an interview with William Archer in 1901.36 Marty’s variation, which 
seems to parallel the Sophoclean principle, holds that to begin life “in earnest” is to live sincerely, 
and to live sincerely is to suffer, but a life without suffering is not fully lived at all. The 
“advanced” doctor in Jude the Obscure (1895) pushes this outlook further when he pronounces to 
Jude “the beginning of the coming universal wish not to live.”37 Marty’s sense that suffering is an 
intrinsic part of life does not seem borne out of a nihilistic impulse, because she still finds 
purpose in life. It seems closer, perhaps, to the sentiment George Eliot expresses in Adam Bede 
(1859), that “sorrow lives in us as an indestructible force [. . .] passing from pain into 
sympathy.”38 Either way, the narrative events that follow the scene bear out the veracity of her 
impression that suffering is an intrinsic aspect of living. Her oblique attempt to express to Giles 
that a sympathy exists between them is futile. In rejecting her impression of life, “You ought not 
to feel like that, Marty,” Giles all but rejects Marty herself. And after he dies as a result of his 
steadfast devotion to Grace, it falls to Grace herself to comprehend the synchronicity that had 
always existed between Marty and Giles. Grace realizes too late that Marty “had formed his true 
complement in the other sex, had lived as his counterpart, had subjoined her thoughts to his as a 
corollary” (297).  
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For Grace, it is “the possibilities of a refined and cultivated inner life, of subtle 
psychological intercourse” that initially attracts her to Edred Fitzpiers and causes her to reject 
Giles (148). Yet it is Marty that exemplifies such a sensibility, manifested through her 
responsiveness to the landscape and close listening to its “sighs,” her sympathy toward Giles in 
sensing that the sadness she interprets in the sound corresponds with them both, and her 
expansive reflectivity in extending this thought to relate to the vicissitudes of all lives. The 
potential of the sigh is pushed further, as Hardy demonstrates that as well as constituting both 
reflective and instinctive activity, the sigh can also inspire reflective activity in the process of 
cultivation. Marty’s reflective sympathy is, of course, precipitated by a site of cultivation far 
removed from those Spencer had referred to in “The Origin”: “the theatre, the concert, the picture 
gallery” (407). As we have seen, for Spencer, “cultivation” was the refinement of sensibility 
through aesthetic culture. But here Hardy shows a comparable type of amelioration against the 
backdrop of a different type of cultivation: the preparation of land for growing trees. Marty’s 
revelation occurs during a scene of planting, the cultivation of nature. The irony doesn’t seem 
coincidental, as Hardy plays on the multivalency of “cultivation,” slipping across its primary 
senses at the same time as he contests the secureness of the gap between these two definitions. In 
presenting a kind of fellow-feeling that has been prompted by tending to nature, one that is stirred 
by its “sighs,” Hardy gestures toward an ironic countermodel of sympathy that is generated 
through cultivation—just not the type of cultivation Spencer had in mind. 
The sigh continued to intrigue Hardy long after he abandoned the novel, and he often 
returned to it in his poetry, perhaps finding the flexibility of the form conducive to a fuller and 
more concentrated exploration of the nonlexical aspects of language. The sigh appeared most 
notably in the lyric poem “The Sigh,” in which the speaker expresses a mournful regret for his 
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earlier inattentiveness to his lover’s sighs, expressed when “Some sad thought she was 
concealing,” “mingled with her feeling.”39 The speaker is unable to belatedly discern the subtly of 
the feeling that prompted these laments, nor the state of mind that they might have reflected. Too 
late, the speaker comprehends that these quiet, indirect sounds signaled a complexity of emotion 
that might have been shared if only he had listened more carefully. The speaker is left asking 
“why she sighed,” an unanswerable question that is called into the void, just as the repetition of 
“she sighed” at the end of each stanza generates a formal echo across the poem that draws the 
reader’s aural attention toward the elusive eloquence of this very expression.40 Hardy knew the 
“power of [people] putting themselves in another’s place, and taking a point of view that is not 
their own.”41 In the sigh, he found an ideal resource for thinking about the difficulty and 
contingency of such an act, as well as the importance of nonlexical forms of communication in 
realizing an embodied form of sympathy. Centralizing poetic effect in his novelistic 
representations of the sigh and returning to it later in a fully poetic mode, Hardy recognized that 
engaging with such ideas in an aesthetic register could be as generative as a narrative approach. 
But his interest did not extend, as Spencer’s did, to mobilizing sympathy as a criterion of 
difference. Instead, in Hardy’s vision, the sigh—a shared expression—might offer a salve of 
commonality. 
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